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-.At.a,recent .conference a t  the University of Michigan, called "The 
Historic Turn in the Human Sciences" (October 1990), a variety of scholars from a 
variety of fields talked about the shift toward a historical perspective in their 
respective fields. Professors of anthropology, sociology, history, political science, 
law, and literature discussed the ways in which history is being used-in their 
fields, and the kinds of impact this historic turn has been having. One of the 
many things that was interesting about the conference was how difficult i t  was to 
stay on the subject of the historic turn. The discussion'kept slipping into a 
consideration of (and a battle over) the discursive turn, the more or less 
simultaneous shift in all these fields not only to history, but to culture, language, 
and discourse. In the middle of one of these moments of slippage, the historian 
Geoff Eley said, "the anthropologists have totally lost control of the culture 
*concept." This is clearly true, and all for the good insmy view (I don't view it as 
 losing control but as colonizing all the other disciplines), but the same must be said 
-about the field of history: the historians have totally lost control of the history 
concept. But while we have some good idea of what the culture concept is or has 
been, what is the "history concept?" 
There was little agreement about this a t  the conference and actually 
little effort even to worry about it. I would suggest that the central concept over 
which the historians have lost control is narrativity, the telling of stories. 
Actually, it is probably more accurate to say that they have abandoned narrativity 
rather than losing control over it. There has been a long debate about the fate of 
narrative history among historians which I cannot summarize here, but in general 
it is safe to say that simple narrative history, telling stories about the past, or 
rendering the past as story, is now considered a low prestige line of activity in that 
field - "mere" narrative history. Indeed when the historians a t  the conference 
themselves worried about the historic turn - what does it mean for history that 
everyone else is turning to history - they tended very specifically to turn away 
from narrativity, into a realm that they thought of as "theory." Rather than 
trying to retheorize their central term, as anthropologists tend to do with culture 
in every generation, they were embarrassed by it, it was not "theoretical enough". 
Now essentially I want to make two points today. First, I want to 
argue that one of the most interesting modes of contemporary social and cultural 
theorizing is heavily dependent on narrativity - here I refer, a t  the risk of boring 
those who have heard me beat this particular drum before, to the various modes of 
so-called practice theory. And second, I want to argue that the one major mode of 
contemporary theorizing that poses itself as anti-narrative - post-structuralist 
and/or post-modernist theorizing - fundamentally mislocates its own subject 
matter. 
In my version of practice theory, social life is triply narrativized. 
First, and most obviously, much of what anthropologists collect in the field is 
stories. They may be.fragmented, discontinuous, contradictory, and so on, but 
unless we force informants to perform unnatural acts like answering 
questionnaires, making lists, or helping us fill in genealogical grids, what they tell 
us is stories, or pieces thereof. Second, we make stories - analytic, interpretive, 
explanatory, and so forth - of their stories. I need not elaborate here on the kinds 
of stories we make - the list would include all the theoretical modalities in which 
anthropology has operated since its inception. I only note that most of the kinds of 
stories we have made, a t  least in anthropology, have effectively obliterated the 
storyness, the narrative nature of the material, from which they emerged. 
Contemporary practice theory, on the other hand, attempts to incorporate and 
build on those stories, to integrate the intentionality, the purposefulness, embodied 
in informants' narratives, with our own stories of structural determinations of 
various sorts. And finally, for both the people we study and for ourselves, local 
stories - meaning. anything from villagers' .gossip to grossly-ambitious academic 
works - are always versions of larger cultural and historical stories - cultural 
schemas, cultural scenarios, cosmological dramas, and so forth. I t  is not only us as 
academics who swim with varying degrees of self-consciousness in a sea of so-called 
master narratives; this is the general condition of human beings in culture and in 
history. 
At the heart of practice theory i s  an, assumption that-actors' 
"intenti~nalities,~purposes, desires are integral, rather than incidental; to bothrthe 
reproduction and transformation of culture and history. These intentionalities are 
always heavily structured by cultural frames, and heavily constrained by material 
and political life, but purposive actors make those frames and- constraints as much 
as they are made by them. Whether one emphasizes the structurally undergirded 
f P r a c h  bricolage of ordinary social life, as Bourdieu does .in Outline of a' Theory o 
(1977), or the historically cataclysmic clash of culturally orchestrated practices as 
Sahlins does in.Historica1 Metaphors (1-981), or some combination of the two as I 
did in High Rellgrnn 
. . 
- - (1989), the point is the same: social. actors are engaged in 
trying to make something of their lives, and neither history nor culture make a 
great deal of sense unless one understands what they were trying to do - unless 
one understands their narratives, and the cultural and/or theoretical master 
narratives from which they construct them. 
In all of this Foucault is a pivotal figure. Foucault does not appear to 
be interested in narratives, and certainly not in intentionalities. Yet Foucault's 
concern (e.g., 1982) with the ways in which power-saturated discourse and power- 
saturated practices construct and constrain subjects is central to my version a t  
least of practice theory. One way to read Foucault's arguments about the 
discursive construction of subjects, and the way I choose to read him here, is that 
discourses are worthy of analytic and political attention precisely because they 
place people in narrative frames not of their own choosing or, to put it more 
extremely, they systematically rupture people's capacity to narrate their own 
scripts. Foucault is not suggesting that there could be some world in which 
everyone is free to narrate him- or herself, only that for every discourse that 
prevails, there are other discourses that are disabled from taking shape - although 
there is always the possibility that they may a t  some other moment of history. 
Let me pursue for a moment this notion of the rupturing of - 
narrativity. I said earlier that there is one strand of modern theory that can be 
taken as largely anti-narrative - what is now commonly called postmodernism. 
Postmodernism identifies a specific set of characteristics of social life, and of our 
representations of social life, that have been hitherto unrecognized and/or 
unrepresented. These include, among other things, what Frederic Jameson (1984) 
has called "depthlessness" - a kind of flattening of affect in postmodern 
subjectivities, paralleled by the abandonment of various "depth models" in social 
theorizing (base/superstructure, egolid, etc.) - as well as "a consequent weakening 
of historicity, both in our relationship to public History and in ... new forms 
of. ..private temporality1'(1984: l8), or in other words a depthlessness of time as 
well as of subjectivity. As Jameson recognizes, there are a t  least two stances 
involved in the recognition of these (and a whole host of related) postmodern 
phenomena. One stance posits the phenomena as general characteristics of the 
human social and cultural condition, and celebrates theoretical and methodological 
shifts that mimic, even embody, them. The other - Jameson's own position, as 
well as that of several other thinkers - posits the phenomena as historically 
specific to late capitalism, requiring critical deconstruction rather than celebration. 
The postmodernist line in anthropology has tended to be framed 
within the first of these two stances. Focusing specifically on the question'for this 
paper - the fate of narrativity - postmodernist theorizing in anthropology criticizes 
the,discipline's unreflexive embeddedness in master historical.narratives,. whether 
these be narratives of modernization or of revolution; it criticizes our tendencies to 
write hypercoherent accounts of fundamentally messy societies, cultures, and 
events; and it criticizes our tendency to construct actors as coherent unitary 
subjects and agents with coherent unitary purposes and desires.l These points. are 
-well taken, so long as - in-my view - one does not buy-the larger underlying-claim: 
that the radical disruption of cultural narratives, the radical incoherence of 
-cultural forms,.-and the radical-decentering of the subject- and of what.we think of 
as subjectivity, are characteristic of the human condition as a whole. My position 
in other words is closer to Jameson's, in seeing postmodernism as historically 
specific, but I think Jameson does not go far enough. He is inclined to see all the 
inhabitants of late capitalist societies as victims of postmodernist disruption and 
flattening,.and I think this is true in certain limited areas, particularly in the 
realm of-consumer culture. But Jameson-never arrives at what torme is.the 
central, essentially ,Foucauldian, point: that the decentering and flattening of 
subjectivity, and the disruption of both pastness and futureness, are specifically 
effects of power. Fragmented identities are not equally distributed over the social 
landscape, even in late capitalism, nor is the inability to formulate and enact one's 
own projects, to narrate oneself as both a product of a coherent past and an agent 
of an imaginable future. This point is well put by Abdul JanMohamed and David 
Lloyd in their discussion of minority discourse: 
But where the point of departure of poststructuralism lies within the 
Western tradition and works to deconstruct its identity formations 
"from within," the critical difference is that minorities, by virtue of 
1. All of this is consistent both with the ahistoricity allegedly central to the 
postmodern condition, and with . . one of the striking characteristics of anthropology's 
founding postmodern text, Friting Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986): the 
absence of any historical thinking in that text. At a time when not only a good 
part of anthropology, but most of the other human sciences, are taking "the 
historic turn," the absence of history in that text is remarkable, but consistent 
with its basic premises. 
their very social being, must begin from a position of objective non- 
adentity which is rooted in their economic and cultural 
marginalization vis-e-vis the "West." The non-identity which the 
critical Western intellectual seeks to (re)produce discursively is for 
minorities a given of their social existence. But as such a given it is 
not yet by any means an index of liberation ... On the contrary, the 
non-identity of minorities remains the sign of material damage to 
which the only coherent response is struggle, not ironic distanciation. 
(1987: 16) 
Let me connect this notion of identity damage with a phrase I used 
earlier, the rupturing of narrativity. There are as many varieties of this process 
as there are forms of powerlessness, but I will here give two brief examples. The 
first comes from the 1967 ghetto ethnography, Talley's Corner, by Elliot Liebow. 
Liebow opens his second chapter with a brilliant scene: 
A pickup truck drives slowly down the street. The truck stops as it 
comes abreast of a man sitting on a cast iron porch and the white 
driver calls out, asking if the man wants a day's work. The man 
shakes his head and the truck moves on up the block, stopping again 
whenever idling men come within calling distance of the driver. At 
the Carry-out corner, five men debate the question briefly and shake 
their heads no to the truck. The truck turns the corner and repeats 
the same performance up the next street. (p. 29) 
Liebow goes on to discuss the history of structurally induced failure 
from which one must understand these men's refusal to work: failure in schools, 
in relationships, inability to get jobs in the past or to keep them, and especially 
inability even when working to earn enough to support a family and thus - circling 
back to other failures - to sustain long term relationships of husbandhood and 
fatherhood. Liebow says about the men's refusal of menial and low-paid work, in 
favor of idling about on the street corner, 
To the middle class observer, this behavior reflects a "present time 
orientation" - an "inability to defer gratification." It is this "present- 
time" orientation - as against the "future orientation" of the middle 
class person - that "explains" to the outsider why Leroy chooses to 
spend the day a t  the Carry-out ...; why Richard, who was paid Friday, 
was drunk Saturday and Sunday and penniless Monday;. . .[and so 
forth]. (64) 
Liebow argues that it is not true that the streetcorner man has a 
I 1  present-time orientation;" he has a perfectly good sense of the future. The future 
... however is fundamentally empty: '!It is a.future in which everything is uncertain 
except the ultimate destruction of his hopes and the eventual realization of his 
fears."(66) The book goes on to describe a kind of postmodern subjecthood of these 
men, full of contradictions, disjunctures, and incoherencies: they take great pride 
in-their children but do not live with them and cannot support them; they seek 
good relationships with women but often wind up abusing them; they form intense 
friendships among themselves which nonetheless burn out quickly and often 
* violently. As-Liebow sets up the argument; these patterns emerge from (and of 
course feed back into) the repeated history of failures, and the fundamental 
emptiness of the future. In the language of the present argument, they flow from 
and feed back into a subjectivity that has been systematically denied the 
possibility of enacting or even formulating projects of self-creation, self-realization, 
. self-respect. 
A second example isdrawn from a different genre. 'long ago I began a 
paper on female protagonists in Grimm's Fairy Tales (1944) which I never 
finished. At the time I had never heard of practice theory, but I was interested, in 
a vague and fuzzy way, in essentially the question I am considering here today. 
The tales have been interpreted many times over, most recently from a set of 
specifically feminist perspectives (e.g., Barzelai 1990). My points today pick up on 
pieces of various other interpretations, but bend them in the direction of the 
present argument: that one must see the rupturing of narrativity, the 
fragmentation of the subject's ability to formulate projects, as specifically a 
condition of oppression. In the Grimm's Tales, the process is almost entirely 
directed against female characters, and with a systematicity that seems, despite 
the fact that these tales have no authors as such, virtually conscious and 
intentional. 
In the tales, the idiom in which this point is developed may be shorthanded 
as an idiom of activity or "agency" on the one hand, and passivity and 
renunciation of agency on the other. I should note first that for the most part the 
only consistently active female characters in the tales are wicked - the wicked 
stepmothers/witches who do have projects (to kill the heroine, to ensnare the 
prince into marrying their daughters). They are almost always killed a t  the end, 
which is of course the end of their narrativity with a vengeance; as well as the end 
of the story as such. But I want to focus on the heroines, the little girls and young 
princesses whose tales form a rather surprising 50% of the stories. Most of these 
heroines are in the mode of what the folklorist Propp calls "victim heroes1@(1968): 
although they are the protagonists, the action of the story is moved along by 
virtue of bad things happening to them, rather than their initiating actions as in 
the case of the majority of male heroes. Thus passivity is to some extent built into 
most of these females from the outset. 
Yet a closer look a t  the tales shows that even many of these victim heroines 
take roles of active agency in the early parts of the story. Though their initial 
misfortunes may have happened to them through outside agency, they sometimes 
seize the action and carry it along themselves, becoming - briefly - heroines in the 
active questing sense usually reserved for male heroes. But - and this is my 
central point - they are invariably punished for this. The action of the tales 
systematically, and often ruthlessly, forces them to renounce this active stance, 
forces them to renounce the possibility of formulating their own projects and 
scripting their own narratives. 
At the simplest level, I take these stories (as many other writers have done) 
to be tales of "passage", of moving from childhood to adulthood. For the female 
protagonists, as I will illustrate here, this passage centrally, almost exclusively, 
involves the renunciation of agency. Agentic girls, girls who we may say narrate 
9 
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.themselves. and others too-much. -.even for altmstic reasons - :are punished in one 
of two ways. The less common form of punishment, first, is the denial of passage 
to adulthood. Five of the tales have heroines who are fully active and fully 
successful in enacting their projects. In one version of "Little Red Riding Hood", 
the girl and her grandmother get up on the roofsand successfully kill the wolf and 
turn him into sausage. -In "The Seven Ravens," the girl goes to seek her brothers, 
,and findss and rescues. them with great resourcefulness, virtually unassisted. In 
"Halisel-an&Gretelw; it, is Gretel .who- kills the ~ t c h .  ' In "The 'Robber 
Bridegroom," the girl is helped by an old woman and between the two of them 
they bring about the execution of the robber and his band. And in "Fundevogel," 
the girl actively and resourcefully saves her brother from a wicked old woman. In 
9 87.' 
...A all these cases of active and specifically successful heroism on the part of the 
-'* . . ,- .heroine, the girl does not achieve what the vast majority of Grimm's heroines 
achieve - the mark of.female adulthood, marriage. . Rather than getting married 
she returns%-her natal home .at the end.of the story, and does.not achieve 
passage. 
In the more common female tale, as we all know very well, the heroine gets 
married at the end. But if she has been at all active in the early part of the tale, 
she must invariably pass through severe trials before being worthy of marrying 
the prince, or indeed being worthy of any man at all. These trials always involve 
symbols and practices of utter-passivity. andlor total inactivity, as well as practices 
of humility and subordination. In "Sweetheart Roland" (a variant of 
"Fundevogel") she cleverly saves her skin a t  the beginning, and then saves both 
herself and her lover, but for her pains her lover betroths another woman. In 
response, the heroine turns herself first into a stone, then into a flower, and finally 
cleans house for some time for a shepherd before marrying her sweetheart in the 
end. In "The Twelve Brothers" and "The Six Swans" (variants of each other and 
10 
of "The Seven Ravens") the heroine actively sets out on a quest to rescue her 
brothers; in both cases, despite her good intentions, she causes her brothers 
damage as a result of her activities to save them, and goes through a seven year 
period of complete silence and solemnity (including in one case making shirts for 
her brothers and in the other case simply spinning for seven years) before getting 
married a t  the end. 
Marriage is both the end of the narrative and the end of the girl's 
narrativity. The prince wakes her up, or releases her from her trials, only to take 
over the remaining action of the story. We do not know what form of subjectivity 
emerges for the heroine after this point - that is always left to the reader's 
imagination - but it is safe to say that it is no longer of her own making. 
As this example from Grimm's fairy tale suggests, the rupturing of 
narrativity as an exercise of discursive power has a very long history. Yet even if 
we accept the point that this process is intensified under the conditions of late 
capitalism, it is important to recognize the ways in which people themselves have 
always been trying, and are still trying, to make their lives and worlds coherent, 
to narrate themselves and the worlds in which they live in stories and practices of 
order and especially of purpose. In a recent paper, Josb Limsn explored the 
meaning of barroom dancing and brawling among Mexican Americans of south 
Texas (n.d.). Limsn argues eloquently that, while life for these poor, ethnically 
hyphenated, and socially discriminated against people is indeed full of 
discontinuity, disruption, contradiction, and fragmentation, the forms and patterns 
of their dancing represent a struggle wainst these things, an effort, however 
momentary and inadequate, to construct a world of coherence, or simply a world 
that they make themselves. 
I may seem to have wandered quite far from the questions of history 
and culture with which I began. Nor has this paper been "historical" in any 
commonly recognizable sense. But my point has been that the doing of history and 
the doing of anthropology share (or should share) a common figure, the figure of 
narrativity. Historians have increasingly turned away from narrative history as 
untheoretical, yet important domains of social theory are recognizing the centrality 
(and the theoreticality) of narrative in both the making and the interpreting of 
social life. Moreover, as I have tried to illustrate, those forms of social theory that 
pose themselves as anti-narrative fail to ,understand, or choose to ignore, that the 
rupturing of narrativity is-always anLact of violence and an effect of power. 
This point is beautifully embodied in Salrnan Rushdie's recent novel, 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories (1990). Haroun's father Rashid is a story-teller 
who puts together wondrous stories from the many colored streams of the great 
Story Sea. The father's ability to tell his stories is paralyzed by the operation of 
.dark forces that are intentionally polluting that Sea. The son goes off to-save his 
father, and eventually confronts the Cultmaster of the forces ofqsilence. He says to 
"But why do you hate stories so much?..Stories are fun. .." 
"The world, however, is not for Fun," [the Cultmaster] replied. "The 
world is for Controlling. " 
"Which world?" Haroun made himself ask. 
"Your world, my world, all worlds," came the reply. "They are all 
there to be Ruled. And inside every single story, inside every Stream 
in the Ocean, there lies a story-world, that I cannot rule a t  all. And 
that is the reason why."(l61) 
Haroun goes on to defeat the forces of.silence, and to.restore his 
father's ability to tell stories once again. I end'with a plea for us - anthropologists 
and historians alike - to recognize both the creative and the subversive power of 
stories. We need to work with theoretical frames that incorporate a sense of all 
the things that I have subsumed under the rubric of narrative in this paper - 
purpose, intention, desire; human practices and human projects - even as we 
continue to recognize the powerful operations of society and culture in the 
formulation and enactment, as well as the rupturing, of those narratives. For 
without human narratives in our theories, we can only construct victims. 
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